McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion
This article rebuilds, through conceptual analysis, some of the aspects in Mind and World of John McDowell aimed at broadening the explanatory role of “the unboundedness of the conceptual” thesis. In order to achieve this, the aforesaid thesis –which runs the risk of being object of the idealism’s o...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | spa |
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Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
2021
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones_filosofia/article/view/11738 |
| _version_ | 1801706517687173120 |
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| author | Saharrea, Juan |
| author_facet | Saharrea, Juan |
| author_sort | Saharrea, Juan |
| collection | OJS |
| description | This article rebuilds, through conceptual analysis, some of the aspects in Mind and World of John McDowell aimed at broadening the explanatory role of “the unboundedness of the conceptual” thesis. In order to achieve this, the aforesaid thesis –which runs the risk of being object of the idealism’s objection in its “most pernicious” variants has been connected with the idea of perception as “openness to the world”– which decidedly denies a similar idealism. Although the defense of the perceptual content’s justifying role acknowledges this last thesis, it does not show possible connections with the first one (at least, not in an explicit way). This article, on the contrary, aims at easing this tension, thereby rebuilding McDowell conceptualism’s answer to the argument from illusion. Thus, the conclusion drawn from the distinction between the ordinary possibility of the perceptual error and possibility in principle (of perceptual error) –derived from McDowell’s treatment of perceptual incorrigibility– is that “the unboundedness of the conceptual” and the assertion that perception provides us with direct knowledge of the world’s facts are not incompatible under the perspective of the ordinary possibility. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:oai.revistas.uptc.edu.co:article-11738 |
| institution | Revista Cuestiones de Filosofía |
| language | spa |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | oai:oai.revistas.uptc.edu.co:article-117382023-08-17T04:23:00Z McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion McDowell y el realismo ingenuo. Mind and World ante el argumento por la ilusión Saharrea, Juan McDowell perception possibility argument illusion McDowell percepción posibilidad argumentos ilusión This article rebuilds, through conceptual analysis, some of the aspects in Mind and World of John McDowell aimed at broadening the explanatory role of “the unboundedness of the conceptual” thesis. In order to achieve this, the aforesaid thesis –which runs the risk of being object of the idealism’s objection in its “most pernicious” variants has been connected with the idea of perception as “openness to the world”– which decidedly denies a similar idealism. Although the defense of the perceptual content’s justifying role acknowledges this last thesis, it does not show possible connections with the first one (at least, not in an explicit way). This article, on the contrary, aims at easing this tension, thereby rebuilding McDowell conceptualism’s answer to the argument from illusion. Thus, the conclusion drawn from the distinction between the ordinary possibility of the perceptual error and possibility in principle (of perceptual error) –derived from McDowell’s treatment of perceptual incorrigibility– is that “the unboundedness of the conceptual” and the assertion that perception provides us with direct knowledge of the world’s facts are not incompatible under the perspective of the ordinary possibility. Mediante el análisis conceptual el artículo reconstruye algunos aspectos de Mind and World de John McDowell, orientados a ampliar el rol explicativo de la tesis de la “carencia de límites de lo conceptual”. Para esto se vincula dicha tesis, que corre el riesgo de ser objeto de la objeción de idealismo en sus variantes “más perniciosas”, con la idea de percepción como “apertura al mundo”, que niega decididamente un idealismo semejante. Si bien la defensa del rol justificatorio del contenido perceptivo da cuenta de esta última tesis, no muestra, al menos explícitamente, relaciones posibles con la primera. Este artículo, en cambio, propone resolver esta tensión. Así reconstruye la posible respuesta del conceptualismo de McDowell al argumento por la ilusión. De este modo, a partir de la distinción entre posibilidad ordinaria de error perceptual y posibilidad en principio de error perceptual –derivada del tratamiento de McDowell sobre la incorregibilidad perceptual– se concluye que la “carencia de límites de lo conceptual” y la afirmación de que ordinariamente la percepción nos proporciona conocimiento directo de hechos del mundo, no son incompatibles desde la perspectiva de la posibilidad ordinaria. Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia 2021-04-29 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones_filosofia/article/view/11738 10.19053/01235095.v7.n28.2021.11738 Cuestiones de Filosofía; Vol. 7 No. 28 (2021): Cuestiones de Filosofía; 173-193 Cuestiones de Filosofía; Vol. 7 Núm. 28 (2021): Cuestiones de Filosofía; 173-193 2389-9441 0123-5095 spa https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones_filosofia/article/view/11738/10549 https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones_filosofia/article/view/11738/13321 Derechos de autor 2021 Juan Manuel Saharrea http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
| spellingShingle | McDowell perception possibility argument illusion McDowell percepción posibilidad argumentos ilusión Saharrea, Juan McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title | McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title_alt | McDowell y el realismo ingenuo. Mind and World ante el argumento por la ilusión |
| title_full | McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title_fullStr | McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title_short | McDowell and Naïve realism. Mind and World facing the argument from illusion |
| title_sort | mcdowell and naive realism mind and world facing the argument from illusion |
| topic | McDowell perception possibility argument illusion McDowell percepción posibilidad argumentos ilusión |
| topic_facet | McDowell perception possibility argument illusion McDowell percepción posibilidad argumentos ilusión |
| url | https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cuestiones_filosofia/article/view/11738 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT saharreajuan mcdowellandnaiverealismmindandworldfacingtheargumentfromillusion AT saharreajuan mcdowellyelrealismoingenuomindandworldanteelargumentoporlailusion |
