Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and c...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | spa |
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Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
2022
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496 |
| _version_ | 1801705967637757952 |
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| author | Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider |
| author_facet | Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider |
| author_sort | Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro |
| collection | OJS |
| description | Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:oai.revistas.uptc.edu.co:article-13496 |
| institution | Revista Apuntes del Cenes |
| language | spa |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | oai:oai.revistas.uptc.edu.co:article-134962023-08-23T19:26:08Z Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats. Thomas Schelling es uno de los grandes referentes en teoría de juegos y negociación, pues ha sido reconocido como un pionero al proponer los conceptos y sentar las bases de los modelos formales, basado siempre en la observación y el contraste empírico. Su enfoque sobre la comunicación, las jugadas estratégicas y el compromiso permite entender las ventajas, en términos de poder de negociación, de anunciar públicamente que la decisión ya está tomada, incluso cuando el mensaje es simple palabrería. Tomando este punto de partida, este artículo se centra en cómo la economía experimental ha permitido ampliar y afinar sus propuestas originales. Es posible clasificar esta literatura en tres vertientes: 1) comunicación no vinculante, 2) utilización de jugadas estratégicas, 3) credibilidad y compromiso. Entre los hallazgos se resalta que la comunicación es un mecanismo útil para transmitir información privada y, por lo tanto, afecta las creencias y el comportamiento de los negociadores. Por su parte, las jugadas estratégicas cumplen el rol de transferir la ventaja del primer movimiento al segundo jugador. Por último, el sentido de justicia, el temor a los castigos y la reputación de los negociadores afectan la credibilidad de sus amenazas. Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia 2022-02-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer reviewed Article texto application/pdf text/xml https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496 10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496 Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 No. 73 (2022); 17-42 Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022); 17-42 2256-5779 0120-3053 spa https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/11456 https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/13355 Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
| spellingShingle | Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment Palacio Garcia, Luis Alejandro Díaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title | Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title_alt | Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
| title_full | Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title_fullStr | Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title_short | Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
| title_sort | communication strategic moves and commitment an analysis from the experimental economics |
| topic | Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
| topic_facet | Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
| url | https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496 |
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